Returns to Bidding and Target Finns in Hostile Takeovers:

Some UK Evidence by Mohamad, Shamsher & Md Nassir, Annuar
PERTANIKA14(3),373-381 (1991)
Returns to Bidding and Target Finns in Hostile Takeovers:
Some UK Evidence
SHAMSHER MOHAMAD and ANNUAR MD. NASSIR
Department ofAccounting and Finance
Faculty ofEconomics and Management
Universiti Pertanian Malaysia
43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor Darnl Ehsan, Malaysia.
Key words: takeovers, bidders, targets, abnormal returns, combined gains.
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji kesan pengumuman pengambilalihan terhadap pulangan firma pembidaan dan firma sasaran
dan kekayaan bersama dalam bida pengambilalihan berseteruan di UK. Penemuan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa
firma bida memperolehi pulangan abnormal negatifyang signifikan manakalafirma sasaran memperolehi pulangan
positifyang signifikan. Penemuan ini adalah tekal dengan penemuan dari kajian yang serupa di pasaran saham
Amerika Syarikat. Kekayaan kombinasi yang positifdan signifikan menyiratkan bahawa aktiviti pengambilalihan
adalah pelaburan yang menguntungkan dan tekal dengan bayangan bahawa para pengurns menjalankan aktiviti
pengambilalihan untuk memaksimakan kekayaan dan bukan saiz. firma.
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the returns to bidding and target firms in hostile takeovers and their combined wealth effects on the
announcement of the offer in the UK. The findings reveal that bidderfirms earn negative and significant abnormal
returns, whereas target firms earn positive and significant abnormal returns. The gains to target firms more than
compensate the losses suffered lry bidders as the combined gains arepositive and significant. Thesefindings are consistent
with those documented in the US. The positive and significant combined gains imply that takeovers are wealth-creating
investments, which is consistent with the notion that managers pursue takeovers to maximise wealth rather than size of
theirfirm.
INTRODUCTION
Previous studies on acquisitions in the UK by
Newbould (1970), Singh (1971), Utton (1974),
Franks et al. (1977), Firth (1980), Barnes (1978,
1984) and Dodd and Quek (1985) concentrated on
returns to bidders and targets in mergers rather
than takeovers. This could have been due to the
<;lvailabilityofdata on mergers and/or the popularity
of this technique at that time. These studies which
used different methodologies on different samples
of firms in different time periods concluded that
mergers in general did not create any wealth for the
bidder shareholders though the targershareholders
always gained.
At present, hostile takeovers are as popular as
mergers, but little research has been done on firms
involved in takeovers. This study intends to
explore the behaviour of announcement period
returns and the combined wealth effects of
bidders and targets involved in takeovers in the
UK.
Total Bidder Returns
At the announcement of the bid, the bidder is
expected to offer a price above the current market
price of the target firm but below the bidder's
estimated value for the target.
If the successful bidder has a high chance of
acquiring the target firm at a price below the
estimatedvalue for the target, part of the potential
gains from the takeover identified by the bidder
should accrue to the bidder's shareholders. The
This paper is a continuation of our earlier paper entitled "Means of Payment and Bidding Firms' Returns in the UK A Test of Information
Hypothesis" published in PERTANlKA 14 (1) 1991:93-100.
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expected gains should be discounted in the bid-
der's share price and the bidder's shareholders
should earn positive abnormal returns at the an-
nouncement of the offer.
Finance theory predicts that firms pursue new
capitalinvestmentswhen the investments have posi-
tive effects on their market value. McConnell and
Muscarella (1985) provide evidence in support of
this view, reporting asignificant positive share price
reaction for a sample of industrial firms which
announced an increase in planned capital expen-
ditures. Acquisitions are also capital investments
and if the acquisition has any wealth-creating effect
for the bidder firm, the bidder returns at the an-
nouncement of the offer should be positive.
Evidence from the US on bidder returns in
takeovers show mixed results. For example,
Asquith's (1983) study showed that the two-day
announcement abnormal returns for bidders are
positive but not significantly different from zero.
Dodd's (1980), and Asquith and Kim's (1982) stud-
ies showed that bidders in takeovers earn signifi-
cant negative returns at the two-day announcement
period, whereas Bradley (1980) and Bradley et ai. 's
(1983) studies showed that bidders in takeovers
earn significant positive abnormal returns at the
two-day announcement period.
Generally, most findings on daily and monthly
returns to bidders in takeovers in the US tend to be
either negative or insignificantly positive (Jensen
and Ruback 1983, Rappaport 1987.
In the UK, Franks et ai. 's (1988) comparative
study of firms involved in takeovers in the UK and
US provided some evidence with respect to the
effect ofthe form ofpayments on bidder and target
returns in the UK, but not total returns and com-
bined wealth effects. To fill the gap, this study
ascertains the behaviour of returns to 90 bidder
firms involved in hostile takeovers in the UK at the
announcement of the offer.
Target Returns
Evidence from the US in general has consistently
shown that the two-day announcement abnormal
returns of target firms in hostile takeovers are
positive and statistically significant (Asquith 1983;
Dodd 1980; Asquith and Kim 1982; Bradley et ai.
1983; Bradley 1980 andJarrell and Poulsen 1989).
The shareholders of the target firm earn
positive abnormal returns possibly reflecting the
expected gains of the combined firm and the
large premiums offered by the bidder at the
announcement.
In the UK, there is no published evidence
'On returns to targets in hostile takeovers. Franks
et ai. 's (1988) study provides evidence on returns
to targets in takeovers classified according to the
means of payments offered to their targets but not
on total returns of targets in takeovers. Therefore
this study aims to ascertain the effect of takeover
announcements on the target firms involved in
hostile bids in the UK. The returns behaviour of
target firms involved in hostile takeovers was
observed at the announcement of the offer.
Combined Gains
An attempt by a bidding firm to gain control of the
target's resources and implement a higher valued
strategy is assumed to create wealth through
synergistic effects. Synergy is realised when an
increase in the aggregate market value of the two
firms is more than a simple sum of market value of
each firm (Weston and Copeland 1988).
If bidder managers seek to maximise their
shareholders' wealth, their takeover activity can be
justified only if there is some form of synergy
present which will contribute towards the creation
of such wealth. Synergy may manifest itself in the
form of increase in market power, possession of a
new technology, superior research and develop-
mentfacilities, better ditributional facilities, skilled
management, production and sales economies of
scale or any other form which will help towards the
creation of more wealth.
The presence and the potential of exploiting
these expected synergies explain partly the ration-
ale for bidders willing to pay large premiums for
their targets.
In the UK, there is no published evidence of
combined returns of firms in takeovers at the
announcement of the offer, but findings on
combined returns to bidders and targets in
mergers have been reported by Firth (1980) and
f Franks et ai. (1977). Firth (1980) found that the
; combined gains of bidders and targets in mergers
~ in the announcement month were virtually zero.
However, Franks et ai. (1977) found that combined
gain~were positive, implying the presence of syn-
ergy for firms merging within the brewing and
distil)ing sector.
In US, studies on takeovers by Dodd and Ruback
(1977), Bradley (1980), Bradley etai. (1983), Schip-
. per and Thomson (1983) found large and signifi-
cant positive abnormal returns for target share-
holders and small but significant positive abnormal
returns to bidding firms' shareholders, implying
that the positive combined gains are in support of
the synergy hypothesis. Mandelker's study (1974)
concluded that bidding firms earned normal re-
turns whereas abnormal returns from mergers
374 PERTANIKAVOL. 14NO.3, 1991
RETURNS TO BIDDING AND TARGET FIRMS IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: SOME UK EVIDENCE
accrue to target shareholders, implying positive
combined gains.
However, when the combined gains to target
and bidding firms' shareholders are not positive, it
implies that there is merely a transfer of existing
rights of ownership from target to the bidder. Roll
(1986) in his analysis of successful takeovers in US
suggested that gains by targets are a simple wealth
transfer from bids that are more than their worth
(also known as the Hubris Hypothesis).
Dodd (1980) found significant negative re-
turns for bidders and positive returns to target
firm's shareholders at the announcement of the
bid and concluded that gains arising from the
acquisition to the target shareholders were at the
expense of the bidding firms's shareholders.
In ascertaining the presence ofsynergy in take-
overs using the abnormal returns analysis, it is
difficult to identify the particular type of synergy
present. The presence of synergy is detected if the
combined abnormal returns ofbidders and targets
in the takeover offer are significantly positive at the
announcement of the offer.
To ascertain the presence ofexpected synergy
in takeovers, the combined returns to bidders and
targets at the two-day announcement period were
calculated and the results are presented in Table 3.
MATERIALSAND METHODS
Data
The data analysed in this study were drawn from
public announcements of proposals to acquire a
target firm by means of a takeover. The sample
contains bidder and target firms engaged in
successful takeovers for the years 1985 to 1988, for
which daily share returnswere calculalted for eleven
days surrounding the announcement day. The
announcement day is the day of the most recent
offer for the target. The takeover offer was
considered successful when the bidding firm
acquired the required interest in the target firm's
common equity (i.e. equal to, or more than, 30 per
cent). The offers studied were not preceded by a
merger attempt.
The sample was identified by a search ofvari-
ous financial publications such as 'Acquisition
Monthly', 'Investors Chronicle'. 'Business Research In-
dex', 'Fair and Trade Publications', 'Stock Exchange
Yearbook' and financial newspapers. The sampled
firms were subjected to the following requirements:
(a) The takeover offer was considered successful if
itwas declared unconditional as to acceptances.
(b) Bidder and target firms were listed on the
London Stock Exchange and only alpha and
some beta stocks were sampled to mitigate the
non-synchronous trading problem.
(c) To filter the confounding effects of exogenous
events on bidder returns during the eleven days
surrounding the event, the bidders and targets
sampled did notexperience any major corporate
event at the time of the announcement of the
offer. Major corporate events were defined as
death or appointment of key executives,
announcement of financial reports or new
investment programmes (except for the
takeover offer under study) for the eleven days
surrounding the announcement.
(d) Daily share prices for each firm were available
for at least 58 days before and 58 days after the
announcement day.
The final sample contained 90 bidder and 90
target firms.
Methodology
The research hypotheses examined were tested by
applying an event-type methodology similar to that
described in Fama et al. (1969) and Travlos (1987).
The ordinary-leastsquares coefficientsofthe market
model regression were estimated over the period n
= -58 to n = - 6 and n = + 6 to n = +58 relative to the
day of the initial announcement. Daily abnormal
common stock returns were calculted for each firm
i over the interval n = - 5 to n = +5.
Abnormal Return = Rio - (a + BRmn>
(lz)
For a sample of N firms, daily average abnor-
mal returns (AR) for each day n are computed by
~!iAR n £..
i=1 N
or
1 N
- I(Rin - a - BR mn )
N i=1
n= -5, ,0, ,+ 5 N = the number of firms
where R. is the returns for common stock of firm
In
i, Rmo is return for the market approximated by the
overall market index on day n, aI'~ are ordinary-
least squares estimates of the market model
parameters (adjusted for non-synchronous trading
problem using Dimson's (1979) aggregated
coefficient approach). The daily returns were
calculated from stock prices after adjustment for
capital changes such as dividends and stock splits.
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RESULTS
and
TABLE!
Summary of the average abnormal returns (AR) and
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of bidders
in takeovers at the two-day announcement period.
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
-0.8915
(-8.457)**
AR
-0.1005
(-0.954)
o
Event Day
-1
Bidders
Bidder CAR (-1,0) -0.992
(-6.65)**
~T2 - Tl + 1
** Significantly different from zero at 1%level
For bidders, the abnormal return on day-l is
negative (AR=-0.1005) but not significantly differ-
ent from zero (t = - 0.954) at 1%level, whereas the
announcement day abnormal return is negative
(AR = - 0.8915) and significantly different from
zero at 1 % level (t = - 8.457) (Table 1). The two-
day announcement CAR is also negative (CAR =
-0.992) and significantly different from zero at 1 %,
level (t = -6.65). The results indicate that bidders'
shareholders in takeovers suffer losses at the an-
nouncement of the offer. The findings of negative
abnormal returns to bidders are apparently not
consisten twith the view that acquisitions are wealth-
creating investments. However, there might be
other factors dominating the positive wealth effect
of acquisitions at the announcement of the offer.
For example, in the enthusiasm to take over the
target resources, the bidder management may have
overstretched its financial and management re-
sources result in some loss of efficiency in its cur-
rent business activities, which is reflected in the
share price.
There is also a possibility that bidders offer
premiums that are higher than those expected
Total Bidder Returns
This section presents the average abnormal returns
and the cumulative abnormal returns for all the
bidders in takeovers for the eleven days surrounding
the announcement. The details are presented in
Table 1 (A) in the Appendix and the summary of
the two-day announcement period returns form
this table is presented in Table 1 below.
The estimation period is from n= - 58 to n = -
6 and n = + 6 to n = + 58 and the analysis period is
from n =- 5 to n =+ 5. The standardizing factor S
which takes into account the problem of non-
constant variance of the residuals in the estimation
and analysis period, was computed as follows:
l ]x1 (R mn - Rm)2Sin S~ (l + L + --',-L-----'--1(~!(Rmk_R m)2
where S~s the residual variance for security i from
1
the market model regression, L is the number
of observations during the estimation period (i.e.
106 days), R
mk is the return on the market index for
the k day of the estimation period, R
mn
is the return
on th~market index for day n in the analysis period,
and R mis the average return of the market index
(i.e. market portfolio) for the estimation period.
Assuming that individual abnormal returns
are approximately normally distributed and
independent across time and across securities, the
statistic t and ~!T2 which follow unit-normal
distribution (Dodd and Warner 1983) are used to
test the hypothesis that the average standardized
abnormal returns (AR:) and average cumulative
standardized abnormal returns (C~IT2) equal
zero, where
~ *AR*t = \IN
n
The returns for each firm were also adjusted for any
significant first-order auto-correlation using
Cochrane-Orcutt's (1949) quasi-first-difference
approach before calculating the abnormal returns.
The AR for each firm were adjusted for the
difference in size of bidders and targets. Size was
measured in terms of the total market value of the
firms at the announcement day. Average cumula-
tive abnormal returns (~!T2)were also derived
by summing the AR over the eleven days surround-
ing the announcement. The expected values of
AR: and~!T2are zero in the absence ofabnor-
mal performance.
*The test statistics of AR nand~!T2are based
on the average standardized abnormal returns and
the average standardized cumulative abnormal
returns respectively, where
AR~ = AR n = 1.- f (Rin - ex - BR mn
Sin N i=! Sin
T2
CARTlT2 = L AR~,
t=Tl
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TABLE I (A)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) of all ninety bidders for the
eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
by the market for targets at the announcement of
the offer. Large premiums are perceived by the
market as increasing the chances of the bidder not
being able to realise positive expected returns in
the post-acquisition period, which consequently
exerts a selling pressure on the bidder shares. The
pre-takeover share price can be assumed to reflect
an expectation that the bidding firm will pursue
investments, including acquisitions, yielding a rate
of return above the minimum acceptable or the
cost- of - capital rate. Thus, if the market believes
that the acquisition will at best only earn the cost-of-
capital, the share price can be expected to decline.
The short-selling ofbidders' shares around the
announcement of the takeovers by arbitrageurs
could have contributed to the significant negative
abnormal returns at the tw<Hiay announcement
period. This action on the part of arbitrageurs
exerts a downward pressure on the bidders' share
price.
The significant negative abnormal returns for
all bidders at the two-day announcement period in
this study are not comparable with that of Barnes
(1978, 1984), Dodd and Quek (1985), Utton (1974),
and Franks et at. 's (1977) findings on returns to bid-
der firms in the UK, because they studied a sample
of mergers rather than takeovers.
The findings are also not comparable to Franks
et al.'s (1988) findings on bidder returns in take-
overs because their sample of bidders was
classified according to means of payments, and
not on total bidder returns.
However, the negative announcement day re-
turns for all bidders in this study are consistent with
** Significantly different from zero at 1%level.
Years 1985 through 1988.
AR
1.4322
(7.844)**
2.0534
(11.250) **
o
3.486
(23.385)**
Event Day
-1
The positive abnormal returns to target share-
holders at the announcement of the offer might be
due to the expected benefits of the takeover and
the large premiums offered by the bidders. Two
days prior to the official announcement there is evi-
dence of positive abnormal returns (AR = 0.2658)
which are significantly different from zero at 5%
level (t = 2.521), which could be due to information
leakage about the offer. However this seems to be
a one-sided leakage as there is no evidence of
abnormal share price avtivi tyfor bidders during the
same period. The positive and significant two-day
announcement period abnormal returns for tar-
gets in takeovers in the UK are consistent with the
**Significantly different from zero at 1%level.
the evidence from the US. For example, Langetieg
(1978) Asquith (1983), Eger (1983) and Malatesta
(1983) used different samples for different time
periods and concluded that bidder firms earned
significantly negative abnormal returns at the an-
nouncement of the offer.
Total Target Returns
This section presents the average abnormal returns
and the cumulative abnormal returns for all targets
in takeovers for the eleven days surrounding the
announcement. The details are presented in Table
2 (A) and the summary of the two-day
announcement abnormal returns is presented in
Table 2 below.
For target firms (Table 2), the abnormal re-
turns on day - 1(AR = 1.4322) and the announce-
ment day (AR = 2.0534) are positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero at 1 % level. The two-day
announcement CAR is also positive (CAR =
3.486)and significant different from zero at 1%
level (t= 23.385). These results indicate that the
target shareholders earn significant positive abnor-
mal returns at the announcement of the offer.
TABLE 2
Summary of the average abnormal returns (AR) and
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of targets in
takeovers at the two-day announcement period.
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Targets
Target CAR (-1,0)
CAR
0.1017
0.2746
0.4140
0.5929
0.4924
0.1801
0.2167
-0.2911
-0.2546
-0.2223
-0.1400
t-Score
0.965
1.641
1.323
1.697
-0.954
-8.457**
-0.348
-0.706
0.346
0.306
0.782
AR
0.1017
0.1729
0.1394
0.1789
-0.1005
-0.8915
-0.0367
-0.0743
0.0365
0.0323
0.0823
Day
"5
-4
-3
-2
-1
o
1
2
3
4
5
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TABLE 2 (A)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) of all ninety bidders for the
eleven days surrounding the initial announcement.
Years 1985 through 1988
Event Day AR t-Score CAR
-5 -0.0226 -0.215 -0.0226
-4 0.0400 0.380 0.0174
-3 0.1139 1.081 0.1313
-2 0.2658 2.521* 0.3971
-1 1.4322 7.844** 1.8293
o 2.0534 11.250** 3.8827
1 0.0377 0.358 3.9204
2 -0.0087 -0.082 3.9117
3 -0.0094 -0.090 3.9023
4 0.0250 0.237 3.9273
5 0.0080 0.076 3.9353
** Significantly different from zero at I% level
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level.
findings of announcement period target returns
in takeovers in the US.
Combined Total Returns
For the total sample of 90 bidders and 90 targets,
shareholders of bidding firms earned significant
negative abnormal returns whereas shareholders
of target firms earned significant positive
abnormal returns for the two-day announcement
period (Table 3). The gains to target shareholders
more than compensated the losses to bidder
shareholders and the combined gains were positive
(AR = 2.494) and significant at I % level (t = 4.67).
These findings are consistent with the notion that
the market recognises expected benefits from
takeovers at the announcement of the offer,
al though a major portion of the benefits seems to
accrue to the target shareholders. The distribution
of expected benefits at the announcement of the
offer could have been influenced by a combination
of factors such as competition for the target, target
management's resistance, and lack of information
about the target firm and its industry.
It is expected that when the bidder is success-
ful in acquiring the target resources and able to
implement a higher valued operating strategy to
exploit the expected benefits from the takeover, it
will be able to earn the expected returns on its in-
vestment, which is reflected in the share price at the
announcement of the offer.
However, the positive effects ofexpected bene-
fits might be overshadowed by the effects of other
factors operating simultaneously such as competi-
tion, target resistance, valuation error and means
of payment.
The bidder's ability to realise the potential
synergies in the post-takeover period will depend
on how well it is able to integrate the target
resources in its own organisation which requires
experienced and skilful management. The market,
however, gauges the bidder's ability to realise the
expected benefits from the takeover from its past
experience, which is discounted in the bidder's
share price at the announcement of the offer.
In essence, the findings of positive combined
returns in takeovers imply that the intense takeover
activity in recent years is not without purpose, as
wealth is created in the process which is socially and
economically desirable. The positive combined
TABLE 3
Summary ofthe two-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and combined returns for
targets and bidders in the cash, shares and combination offers respectively and for total targets and bidders.
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Total Cash Shares Combination
Sample
N=90 N=30 N=30 N=30
Bidders CAR (-1, 0) -0.992 -0.257 -1.256 -1.044
(-6.65)** (-0.995) (-4.86) ** (-4.04)**
Targets CAR (-1, 0) 3.486 3.874 3.671 2.911
(23.385)** (14.976)** (14.211)** (11.266)**
Combined Gains 2.494 3.617 2.415 1.867
(4.67)** (3.42) ** (2.71)* (2.03)*
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level
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returns also imply that takeovers are an effective
means ofemploying resources to a highervalue use
and are consistent with the notion that they are an
effective tool to discipline complacent managers.
The combined returns of bidders and targets
in cash, share combination offers are positive and
significant, implying that irrespective of the means
ofpayment offered, takeovers are positive net pres-
ent value investments.
Implication of Findings for Growth Maximisation
Hypothesis
In recent years, we observe that takeovers are more
frequent between firms in seemingly unrelated or
loosely related businesses. Als~, most acquired
targets are left to operate as autonomous divisions
run by the same management team that controlled
them before the takeover. A probable reason for
such behaviour on the part of active bidders is that
firms could possibly be responding to the
government's tough anti-competitive rules on
takeovers.
When one firm takes over another firm in the
same industry, the other firms in the industry may
feel insecure and resort to defensive measures
such as pursuing takeovers of other firms, even in
unrelated or loosely related businesses. The
process restores some sort of equilibrium in the
industry in terms of relative firm size. There is an
incentive to increase size because it becomes
difficult and expensive for a potential bidder. The
targets are usually left to manage their own business
with minimum interference, possibly due to the
bidder's lack of expertise in the target's business
and/or the bidder's management style (i.e. strate-
gic control or financial control type of manage-
ment).
Marris (1964), Mueller (1969) and Murphy
(1985) suggest that bidder managers pursue
growth rather than profit objectives because size
provides both pecuniary and non-pecuniary bene-
fits to the bidder managers.
Wiedenbaum and Vogt (1987) argue that
managers prefer to increase the size of their
corporations because the ability ofshareholders to
monitor management decreases in larger and
complex organisations. If most bidder managers
pursue takeovers basically for growth purposes at
the expense oftheir shareholders' interest, we can
expect, on average, their combined gains to be
either zero or negative.
The findings in Table 3 are not consistent with
the growth maximisation hypothesis. The findings
are consistent with the notion that bidders pursue
takeovers with the intention of increasing wealth
rather than firm size. These findings are consistent
with the activities oflarge conglomerates in the UK,
such as BTR and Hanson Trust. Their success is
attributable to the strong management team which
effectively employs a 'financial-control' type of
management style and pursues an effective
rationalisation policy subsequent to taking control
ofthe target resources. BTRand Hanson Trust take
over firms in unrelated business, keep the most
profitable part of the business and sell off the other
parts which have very poor fit with their own busi-
ness and are making losses. The proceeds from the
sale help to recoup part of the purchase price.
In the UK, there is no published evidence of
combined gains of bidders and targets in hostile
takeovers, though there is evidence of combined
gains of merging firms in the industrial sector
provided by Firth (1980) and in the brewing and
distilling sector by Franks et al. (1977).
However, it is not appropriate to compare the
findings of combined gains of firms involved in
hostile bids in this study with those of Firth or
Franks et al. because mergers are technically
different from hostile bids.
The positive significant combined gains of
bidders and targets in this research do not support
Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis which postulates
that takeovers are zero-sum game, that is gains to
target shareholders are offset by the losses to
bidder shareholders.
CONCLUSION
The two-day announcement cumulative abnormal
returns of all bidders in the takeover sample is
significantly negative and for targets, it is
significantly positive. The negative and significant
abnormal returns to bidder firms might have been
due to one or more ofthefollowingfactors: expected
loss of efficiency in the bidder's current business
operations due to management time amI effort
spent on pursuing the takeover; the takeover's lack
of cormmercial or industrial logic as perceived by
the market; excessive premiums offered to target at
announcement which could have been due to the
expected resistance from the target, competition
from other potential bidders and lack of
information about the target's business and its
industry; short-selling of bidder's shares by
arbitrageurs or due to specific-bid effect which
seems not to fit into the bidder's business but is an
essential part of the bidder's long-term financial
strategy.
The negative abnormal returns to bidders at
announcement, however, cannot imply that bidder
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management are not acting in the best interests of
their shareholders, because the findings do not
account for the long term effect of takeovers but
just the two-day announcement returns. There is
also no evidence to indicate that the loss to share-
holders benefits the management. It is naive to
assume that bidder managers are consistently
making irrational investment decisions, because if
they are then they are jeopardizing own position as
they would become the target of other bidders. It
might be that the majority of the bidders are pur-
suing targets merely as a long term strategy to gain
a competitive advantage in their respective markets
or industries.
This view is supported by the fact that the
combined gains of bidders and targets are signifi-
cantly positive implying that takeovers do create
wealth for the shareholders ofthe combined firms.
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